Based on an analysis of 718 X\/Twitter posts by Miqrab AI on May 14, 2025, online conversations in Iraq were dominated by major regional geopolitical shifts, particularly concerning Syria and Saudi Arabia’s diplomatic overtures with the West. These developments sparked a stark and often critical comparison with Iraq’s political situation, which many users described as stagnant and overly influenced by Iran, highlighted by the concurrent visit of a top Iranian general to Baghdad. These external events fueled intense domestic debates, resurfacing deep-seated sectarian tensions, with accounts trading blame for the country’s current state and historical grievances, while others expressed pessimism about Iraq’s standing on the international stage.<\/p>\n
A significant debate erupted over shifting alliances in Syria, focusing on two different narratives. On one side, prominent militia commander Abu Azrael – Abu Azrael<\/a> (Post Impact: 100%)<\/strong> issued a stark warning about the formation of a new “Sufyani’s army,” claiming that a resurgent ISIS, newly equipped with missiles and drones, was being supported in Syria. He declared, “From this moment, the formation of the Sufyani’s army has begun… The confrontation with Bani Umayya has become inevitable.”<\/em> On the other side, numerous accounts reacted with shock and sarcasm to the apparent diplomatic rehabilitation of Ahmed al-Sharaa (formerly Abu Muhammad al-Jolani), leader of Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham. Commentators like Muna Sami<\/a> (Post Impact: 61%)<\/strong> and Imad Al Musafir<\/a> (Post Impact: 26%)<\/strong> mocked al-Jolani’s previous role fighting Americans in Iraq, contrasting it with his current meetings with them. Meanwhile, Shaho Al-Qaradaghi<\/a> (Post Impact: 23%)<\/strong> framed the meeting as a “historic moment” that Tehran had expended great effort to prevent.<\/p>\n A dominant theme was the sharp contrast drawn between the diplomatic successes of Gulf nations, particularly Saudi Arabia, and the perceived political paralysis and foreign subservience in Iraq. Rusly Al-Maliki<\/a> (Post Impact: 16%)<\/strong> argued that the “Riyadh summit” had completely overshadowed the upcoming Baghdad summit, leaving Iraq with nothing significant to discuss while major regional agreements were made elsewhere. This sentiment was echoed by Zina Al Saab<\/a> (Post Impact: 14%)<\/strong>, who quipped, “Some people are visited by Trump, and some are visited by Qaani!!!”<\/em> Hiba Al-Nnayib<\/a> (Post Impact: 26%)<\/strong> made a direct comparison between Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, who she claims “turned Saudi Arabia into the center of Arab decision-making,” and Iraqi religious leadership. Steven Nabil<\/a> (Post Impact: 5%)<\/strong> summarized the view by stating that while Gulf countries host world leaders and Syria sees sanctions lifted, Iraqi politicians receive the Iranian Quds Force commander, sending a message that “Iraq is an Iranian protectorate.”<\/p>\n The arrival of Esmail Qaani, commander of Iran’s Quds Force, in Baghdad triggered a wave of condemnation and resentment. His visit was seen by many as a symbol of Iranian hegemony over Iraq’s sovereignty, especially as it coincided with major diplomatic summits elsewhere in the region. Dr. Qusay Shafiq<\/a> (Post Impact: 8%)<\/strong> questioned Qaani’s presence in Baghdad ahead of a supposed “Arab summit,” exclaiming, “What is Qaani doing here\u203c\ufe0f”<\/em> Similarly, Yasser Eljuboori<\/a> (Post Impact: 7%)<\/strong> lamented the news, stating, “This is our miserable luck.” The sentiment was shared by Bahaa khaleel<\/a> (Post Impact: 6%)<\/strong>, who referred to Qaani as “the filthy devil” and said he was not welcome. The timing and public nature of the visit were interpreted as a deliberate message of Iranian control over Iraqi affairs.<\/p>\n A widely discussed post by Haider<\/a> (Post Impact: 52%)<\/strong> alleged that the Emir of Kuwait was pressured by Saudi Arabia to alter his diplomatic language regarding the Houthis in Yemen. According to the post, the Emir initially referred to the Houthis as the “concerned authorities in Yemen” but, following pressure from the Saudi Crown Prince, changed the phrasing to “the illegitimate authorities in Yemen.” The post claims that this change occurred on live television after several individuals were sent to lobby the Emir and a note was passed to him, highlighting Saudi influence over regional diplomatic statements.<\/p>\n The regional political shifts triggered a flare-up of sectarian rhetoric and historical grievances among Iraqi social media users. Najeh Abbas Al-Mizan<\/a> (Post Impact: 38%)<\/strong> taunted Gulf states by boasting that Iraq has “more than 60 loyalist militias, and on top of that, Qaani,” while they have none. In contrast, Hiba Al-Nnayib<\/a> (Post Impact: 11%)<\/strong> posted a sectarian comparison, stating, “Saudi Arabia has trade with America, while Iraq under Ja’fari rule has wife-swapping.”<\/em> On the other side, Ahmed Al-Thawaq<\/a> (Post Impact: 10%)<\/strong> credited Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani’s fatwa and “the support of the great Islamic Republic” for defeating ISIS. Haider<\/a> (Post Impact: 7%)<\/strong> posted a long screed blaming “Takfiris and the Muslim Brotherhood” for all of Iraq’s troubles since 2003, accusing them of trying to destroy the new state.<\/p>\n Amidst criticism of Iraq’s government, there was significant praise for the diplomatic achievements of Saudi Arabia under the leadership of Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman (MBS). Multiple posts by Omar Abdul Sattar Mahmoud<\/a> (Post Impact: 10%)<\/strong> celebrated what he described as a “historic transformation” led by MBS. This praise was amplified by Faiq Al-Sheikh Ali\/My word for history<\/a> (Post Impact: 12%)<\/strong>, who celebrated the “great achievement” of Prince Mohammed bin Salman in striking agreements with Trump, while accusing critics of being agents for Iran’s Revolutionary Guard. Aayad Al Twfan<\/a> (Post Impact: 4%)<\/strong> expressed deep gratitude to MBS for his role in getting U.S. sanctions lifted on Syria, stating that his “intelligence, cunning, strength, and honesty” had freed 25 million Syrians from harsh sanctions.<\/p>\n There was a palpable sense of pessimism and cynicism regarding the upcoming Arab League summit scheduled to be held in Baghdad. Several commentators viewed the summit as a failure before it even began, especially when compared to the high-level diplomatic events taking place in Riyadh and Doha. Rusly Al-Maliki<\/a> (Post Impact: 16%)<\/strong> claimed that key agreements on Gaza and Syria were already made in Riyadh, leaving the Baghdad summit with little of substance to address. He also noted that while former U.S. President Trump and major companies visit Riyadh, Iraqi Prime Minister Al-Sudani was struggling to convince leaders to attend. Shaho Al-Qaradaghi<\/a> (Post Impact: 18%)<\/strong> criticized an unnamed Iraqi politician for trying to “sabotage” the summit after having previously incited against it, questioning the “duplicity” of those working to undermine any potential success for Iraq.<\/p>\n The high-profile visits of former U.S. President Donald Trump to Saudi Arabia and Qatar were a major topic of discussion, primarily used as a benchmark against which to measure Iraq’s diminished regional influence. Journalist ZaidBenjamin<\/a> (Post Impact: 23%)<\/strong> provided detailed coverage of Trump’s arrival in Doha and his praise for the Emir of Qatar’s efforts. This generated commentary in Iraq, where figures like Zina Al Saab<\/a> (Post Impact: 14%)<\/strong> and Najeh Abbas Al-Mizan<\/a> (Post Impact: 8%)<\/strong> contrasted Trump’s meetings with Gulf leaders with Iraqi Prime Minister Al-Sudani meeting with local militia commanders. The visits highlighted a painful reality for many Iraqi commentators about their country’s current international standing.<\/p>\n Accounts aligned with the “resistance axis” defended their ideology and criticized the wave of diplomatic normalization in the region. Najeh Abbas Al-Mizan<\/a> (Post Impact: 38%)<\/strong> defiantly told Gulf states to “die in your rage,” boasting of Iraq’s 60+ pro-Iran militias. In a similar vein, Ahmed Al-Thawaq<\/a> (Post Impact: 10%)<\/strong> argued that if not for Ayatollah Sistani’s fatwa against ISIS and Iranian support, the fate of Iraq would have been similar to that of Syria under leaders like al-Jolani. Wasan Al-Shaykhli<\/a> (Post Impact: 8%)<\/strong> expressed confidence that the “resistance axis” would be rebuilt under the leadership of Khamenei, Abdul-Malik al-Houthi, and Naim Qassem, asserting that the “train of normalization has and will have no future.”<\/p>\n Several accounts circulated what they claimed were the specific conditions agreed upon by Syrian leader Ahmed al-Sharaa (Jolani) in exchange for U.S. sanctions being lifted on Syria. Both Sufian Al-Samarrai<\/a> (Post Impact: 5%)<\/strong> and Haider<\/a> (Post Impact: 5%)<\/strong>, referencing a White House statement, listed similar terms. These allegedly include signing the Abraham Accords to normalize relations with Israel, demanding all foreign terrorists leave Syria, deporting Palestinian militants, assisting the U.S. in preventing the return of ISIS, and taking responsibility for ISIS detention centers in northeastern Syria. These posts suggest that al-Sharaa’s shift is part of a broader, transactional regional realignment.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":" Based on an analysis of 718 X\/Twitter posts by Miqrab AI on May 14, 2025, online conversations in Iraq were dominated by major regional geopolitical shifts, particularly concerning Syria and Saudi Arabia’s diplomatic overtures with the West. These developments sparked a stark and often critical comparison with Iraq’s political situation, which many users described as […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":2,"featured_media":8915,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[72,73,78],"tags":[82,52,81,83],"class_list":["post-8914","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-twitter-x","category-iraq","category-daily","tag-daily-reports","tag-iraq-daily-social-media-trends","tag-iraq-public-opinion","tag-trending-x-twitter"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/miqrab.ai\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/8914","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/miqrab.ai\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/miqrab.ai\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/miqrab.ai\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/2"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/miqrab.ai\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=8914"}],"version-history":[{"count":1,"href":"https:\/\/miqrab.ai\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/8914\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":8916,"href":"https:\/\/miqrab.ai\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/8914\/revisions\/8916"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/miqrab.ai\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/8915"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/miqrab.ai\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=8914"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/miqrab.ai\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=8914"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/miqrab.ai\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=8914"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}2. Gulf Diplomacy Contrasted with Iraq’s Perceived Stagnation<\/h2>\n
3. Iranian General Esmail Qaani’s Visit to Baghdad Sparks Outcry<\/h2>\n
4. Kuwaiti Emir Pressured to Change Yemen Stance<\/h2>\n
5. Sectarian Narratives and Blame Dominate Online Debates<\/h2>\n
6. Widespread Praise for Saudi Arabia’s Diplomatic Moves<\/h2>\n
7. Pessimism Surrounds Upcoming Baghdad Arab Summit<\/h2>\n
8. Trump’s Gulf Tour and its Impact on Iraqi Discourse<\/h2>\n
9. “Resistance Axis” Defends Position Amidst Normalization<\/h2>\n
10. Alleged Conditions of Al-Sharaa’s (Jolani) Deal Revealed<\/h2>\n